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Mediterranean countries following a fixed exchange rate regime have been confronted with 
some challenges that test the efficacy of the regimes in place.  These challenges mostly arise 
from the combination of inflationary pressures and the need for further capital account 
liberalisation amid conditions of ample liquidity in the banking system and rapid money 
and credit growth. In light of these developments, some of these exchange rate targeting 
Mediterranean countries are assessing the framework in place or even contemplating change 
to a more flexible arrangement, which would allow them greater freedom to pursue 
domestic objectives.  Theoretical and empirical considerations do not point to the superiority 
of a particular exchange rate regime, but provide broad guidance on the factors and 
conditions that are predisposed to a fixed exchange rate regime and its sustainability in a 
liberalised environment. The case of Cyprus confirms the view that, under certain 
conditions, it is possible to maintain a credible fixed exchange rate regime while advancing 
capital account liberalisation and still achieve the primary objective of monetary policy.   
Adherence to a simple monetary rule, such as an exchange rate target, can confer credibility 
on a central bank and deliver price stability. Another important lesson drawn from the 
Cyprus case is that this strategy requires an independent central bank and needs to be 
supplemented by additional measures.  Monetary aggregates, in particular credit, should be 
closely monitored and controlled, if necessary. The current account also warrants close 
monitoring, both as an indicator of inflationary pressures and as a warning signal helping to 
avoid unsustainable external imbalances.  Finally, capital account liberalisation requires that 
the authorities have in advance a well-prepared and comprehensive plan, including, first 
and foremost, reforms in the conduct of monetary policy and banking supervision.   
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1. Introduction 
The majority of Mediterranean countries follow some type of fixed exchange rate 
regime, with most of them being pegged to the US dollar. It is acknowledged that 
exchange rate anchoring has contributed to monetary policy credibility, fostered 
price stability and exerted a disciplinary effect on other policy areas in the region, 
such as fiscal and structural policies. However, Mediterranean countries have, 
especially in recent years, been confronted with a number of challenges such as 
increased inflationary pressures driven, inter alia, by buoyant domestic demand 
(fuelled by strong money and credit growth) and increasing international energy 
and food prices.1 In addition, efforts to further liberalise the capital (and financial) 
account appear to interfere with policy challenges and exacerbate constraints in the 
conduct of monetary policy. In this context, some of the exchange rate targeting 
Mediterranean countries are assessing the framework in place or even contemplating 
the change to a more flexible arrangement which would allow them greater freedom 
to pursue domestic objectives.   
 
The theoretical and empirical exchange rate literature seems to provide limited 
guidance as to how to address the above challenges.  This difficulty may be best 
captured in the statement that “no single exchange rate regime is right for all 
countries or at all times” (Frankel, 1999).  Hence the policymakers are left with the 
difficult task of designing an evolving exchange rate policy that will be appropriate 
to a country’s characteristics and the prevailing conditions and institutional 
arrangements at any given point in time.   
 
Against this background, the Cypriot experience may be particularly instructive for 
those Mediterranean countries committed to exchange rate targeting. Though one 
might argue that Cyprus is a too small country to serve as a basis for generalisation 
and there had been an exit point, namely accession to the euro area. Though both 
points are valid the long-standing commitment of Cypriot authorities with exchange 
rate targeting under various economic conditions and regimes, both locally and 
                                                           
1 In the wake of the global financial turmoil and economic recession, the aforementioned inflationary pressures 
have been reduced significantly. This, however, was the result of the transmission of the global slowdown into 
the region’s real economy through lower exports, oil revenues, tourist receipts and remittances.  
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internationally, could be useful for those Mediterranean countries, or any country, 
trying to bring inflation down, proceed with financial liberalisation and achieve a 
high degree of nominal and real convergence with its regional peers and/or its 
trading partners.  In Cyprus, a pegged exchange rate regime had been in place from 
1963, the year of the Central Bank of Cyprus’s (CBC’s) establishment until Cyprus’s 
accession to the euro area in 2008.  The Cypriot case exemplifies how the pursuit of a 
credible pegged exchange rate strategy aimed at maintaining price stability through 
exchange rate stability, can lead to the smooth and successful monetary integration 
of a country, while dealing with the emerging challenges, including capital account 
liberalisation. This is especially plausible if such a strategy is reinforced and 
augmented by an independent central bank and the prudent monitoring of money 
(and credit) aggregates as well as the judicious screening of external balances.  
 
After a brief review of the literature on the choice of an exchange rate regime, 
Section 3 summarises the existing regimes in Mediterranean countries.  Section 4 
focuses on economic developments and selected economic features of Mediterranean 
countries pursuing a fixed peg regime and discusses key challenges in these 
countries. Section 5 focuses on the experience of Cyprus and how policy reacted in 
response to adverse conditions and challenges similar to those faced by some 
Mediterranean countries.  The last section draws some conclusions which may prove 
useful for Mediterranean countries.   
 
2. Choosing an exchange rate regime: theoretical and empirical considerations 
The early literature on the choice of the exchange rate regime focused on the 
importance of commodity prices and the sources of shocks, i.e. real or nominal, and 
the role of capital mobility. The consensus among economists in the 1960s favoured 
the pursuit of fixed exchange rates with the theory of optimal currency area, 
suggesting that small open economies are more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates 
compared with larger and relatively closed economies2. The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate arrangements in 1970, brought about a wide range of 
                                                           
2 Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) emphasise an economy’s openness and size as important elements of the 
selection of a fixed exchange rate arrangement. Similarly, Kenen (1969) stresses the importance of the 
geographical concentration of trade.  
 
3 
choices for exchange rate regimes, ranging from pure floating to intermediate 
regimes, hard pegs, currency unions and flexible exchange rates. The high inflation 
prevailing in the late 1970s shifted the attention of the literature to the use of the 
exchange rate as a means of reducing inflation. According to this view, by pegging 
its currency to that of a country with low inflation, a country can import the 
credibility of the foreign central bank (Barro and Gordon, 1983a, 1983b). The 
credibility gains of adopting a peg arrangement were emphasised by many other 
economists, including Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) and Dornbusch (2001). Other 
studies emphasise the trade off between credibility and flexibility and seem to 
favour intermediate regimes (Rogoff, 1985 and Frankel and Rose, 1996). A flexible 
exchange rate regime allows a country to follow an independent monetary policy in 
order to address domestic and external shocks, in contrast to a fixed exchange rate 
regime which limits this ability but requires a higher degree of credibility.  The 
intermediate regime was questioned in the light of large capital flows prevailing in 
the 1990s.  The currency crises of, among others, Argentina in 1991, Mexico in 1982 
and 1994 and East Asia in 1997, have demonstrated that intermediate regimes 
backed by inconsistent macroeconomic policies result in speculative attacks 
(Krugman, 1979 and Flood and Garber, 1984).  Moreover, several studies concluded 
that in an environment of high capital mobility, intermediate solutions should be 
avoided and the choice should be between two corner solutions: either a hard peg or 
a floating exchange rate regime.  
 
The empirical evidence reflecting the above theoretical considerations is also 
inconclusive, suggesting that a choice of regime depends on country specific 
characteristics and that generalisations across countries and over time are not 
possible. Part of the literature aims at assessing the impact of the exchange rate 
regime on economic performance, mainly on inflation and output. Both country-
specific and multi-country studies fail to make generalisations and find it difficult to 
isolate the effect of the exchange rate regime on economic performance as other 
country specific characteristics come into play, such as the openness of the economy 
and simultaneous bias.  With these caveats in mind, many studies seem to associate 
pegged exchange rates with lower inflation (Ghosh et al, 1997, 2002 and Levy-Yeyati  
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and Sturzenegger 2001, 2003a, 2003b). On the growth criterion, the first study finds 
no evidence of a strong link between output growth and the exchange rate regime, 
while the latter studies concluded that fixed rate regimes tend to be associated with 
lower growth.  Bleaney and Franscisco (2007), examining the relationship between 
inflation, growth and the exchange rate regimes for 91 countries over the period 
1984-2001, conclude that countries with soft pegs have similar growth rates to 
countries with floats and slightly lower inflation; hard pegs, however, are superior to 
other regimes in the case of inflation, but fall behind on growth.  Rogoff et al (2003) 
find that for countries which are in the early stage of development, fixed exchange 
rates seem to offer lower inflation without compromising growth objectives.  For 
developed countries, more flexible exchange rate arrangements appear to deliver 
higher growth without the cost of inflation.  In their study of South Eastern and 
Central European countries for the period 1994-2004, De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) 
found that fixed exchange rates seem to be conducive both to low inflation and 
growth. It should be noted that the whole empirical investigation, and not just the 
aforementioned part, is further complicated by the classification of the exchange rate 
regime.  Calvo and Reinhart (2002), among others, argue that many countries 
followed  de facto an exchange rate regime which differed from the one officially 
declared (de jure).   
 
Overall, theoretical and empirical considerations do not point to the superiority of a 
particular exchange rate regime, nor do they provide us with definitive criteria for 
choosing the appropriate regime. Instead, they support the importance of country 
specific characteristics and challenges ensuing from the international environment. 
However, the literature provides broad guidance on the factors and conditions that 
are predisposed to a fixed exchange rate regime and its sustainability in a liberalised 
environment.   
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3. Exchange rate regimes in Mediterranean countries 
A multitude of monetary policy frameworks and corresponding exchange rate 
regimes exist in Mediterranean countries.  With the exception of Israel, which 
follows a free float in the context of inflation targeting, Mediterranean countries 
pursue either a managed float or a pegged exchange rate (see Table 1). Algeria, 
Egypt and Mauritania follow a managed float regime, whereas Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia follow a fixed peg. As far as the last group is 
concerned, Morocco focuses on a basket of currencies with an 80% weight on the 
euro and 20% on the US dollar and Tunisia on a composite of the euro and the 
dollar. Jordan and Lebanon focus on the US dollar, while Libya and Syria are pegged 
to the SDR. Three countries, namely Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, have stated their 
intention to adopt inflation targeting in the future. In addition, most of the 
Mediterranean countries maintain controls on the movement of capital (see Annex 
1). Against this background and in view of plans by some Mediterranean countries 
to proceed with further capital account liberalisation, the issue arises concerning the 
challenges that these reforms present for existing exchange rate regimes, particularly 
for fixed pegs, as capital controls are inevitably more critical to the maintenance and 
success of fixed exchange rate regimes. 
 
In this connection, it should be noted from the outset that exchange rate anchoring 
has contributed to monetary policy credibility, fostered price stability and exerted a 
disciplinary effect on other policy areas in the region, such as fiscal and structural 
policies. However, as will be made apparent in the next section, Mediterranean 
countries have been confronted, especially in recent years, with a number of 
challenges such as increased inflationary pressures driven, inter alia, by buoyant 
domestic demand (fuelled by strong money and credit growth) and an increase in 
international energy and food prices. In addition, efforts to further liberalise the 
capital (and financial) account appear to interfere with these challenges and 
exacerbate constraints in the conduct of monetary policy. These hindrances are 
particularly important in the case of Mediterranean countries following a fixed 
exchange rate regime, as monetary policy is focused on maintaining the exchange 
rate and is therefore relatively more constrained in the attainment of domestic  
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objectives. In this context, monetary policy may also be confronted with a dilemma 
which manifests itself in the “impossible trinity” (i.e. trying to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate while at the same time containing inflationary pressures in the face of 
increased capital inflows and excess liquidity in the domestic banking system). 
Policymakers are thus obliged to strike a balance between exchange rate and interest 
rate flexibility. Against this background, exchange rate targeting Mediterranean 
countries are reassessing the framework in place or even contemplating the change 
to a more flexible regime, which theoretically would allow them to better pursue 
domestic objectives.  As Table 1 shows, with the exception of Jordan, all 
Mediterranean countries following a fixed peg regime maintain controls on capital 
movements (see also Annex 2). 
 
4. Economic developments and selected economic features of Mediterranean 
countries3 
This section examines economic developments in Mediterranean countries from a 
long-term perspective with a view to highlighting broad trends and selected features 
of their performance. The selected indicators, particularly growth and inflation, 
provide a broad assessment of the performance of the peg arrangements in the 
Mediterranean countries.  In addition, fiscal and current account balances and the 
growth of monetary aggregates are important for the challenges that Mediterranean 
countries are confronted with, as negative developments in these might threaten the 
sustainability of the exchange rate regimes. In the same vein, institutional 
arrangements, such as the degree of capital controls and reserve requirements in the 
wake of financial liberalisation, have an important bearing on the exchange rate 
arrangements.  
                                                           
3 The analysis focuses on those Mediterranean countries whose exchange rate regime was characterised as a fixed 
peg at the end of 2008. According to the IMF, these are: Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.     
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Real GDP growth 
Taking a long-term perspective, strong real GDP growth averaging around 5% has 
prevailed in the Mediterranean region over the last decade (see Chart 1). A diversity 
of factors, such as the evolution of hydrocarbon prices, regional recycling of oil 
revenues from the Gulf region, structural reforms and political events have been key 
drivers of this growth pattern, which highlights the heterogeneity of the region’s 
economic features. In addition, the vagaries of the weather seem to affect, to some 
extent, growth performance through the agricultural sector. Some moderation in the 
fluctuation of economic activity is also evident in the last decade, compared with the 
1990s. Limited data available suggest that unemployment in the region remains 
high, especially among the young. 
 
Comparing economic expansion under fixed and floating exchange rates (see Chart 
2), it can be seen that GDP growth rates are similar under the two regimes, but 
growth is more volatile with fixed exchange rates. This cursory analysis provides 
support for Ghosh et al (1997, 2002), among others, who fails to find a strong link 
between output growth and fixed exchange rates.  
 
Inflation 
Inflation has been driven by both global and domestic factors and has exhibited an 
upward trend since 2002, averaging 5%-6% (see Chart 3). Global factors, such as 
rising commodity (mainly oil) and food prices, explain the increase in inflation, at 
least until the second half of 2008.  Given that Mediterranean countries following a 
fixed exchange rate regime are oil-importers (except for Libya and Syria), the pass-
through of global prices should be emphasised as an important factor contributing to 
domestic price developments. This pass-through should also be seen against the 
relatively important weight of food in the CPI baskets of Mediterranean countries. If 
nominal rigidities in wages and prices are removed, global price developments are 
set to further affect domestic prices for Mediterranean countries pursuing a fixed 
peg. Moreover, increasing inflation over the last seven years can be linked, at least to 




Mediterranean countries with floating exchange rate regimes seem to have a higher 
inflation rate than countries with a fixed exchange rate (see Chart 4) as confirmed by 
a number of empirical studies (Ghosh et al, 1997, 2002 and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 2001, 2003a, 2003b).  However, Chart 4 indicates that the trends in 




Overall, with the exception of Libya whose fiscal pattern reflects to a large extent the 
impact of oil production, budget deficits in non-oil producing countries have been 
significant, particularly in Lebanon and Jordan (see Chart 5). Foreign assistance, 
partly to finance the large number of Palestenian refugees, has enabled Lebanon and 
Jordan  to sustain relatively large fiscal deficits. In contrast, Morocco has exhibited a 
favourable fiscal position over time with these countries. Fiscal slippages ensuing 
from discretionary and pro-cyclical policies constitute a serious impediment to the 
conduct of exchange rate targeting-monetary policy and, therefore, Mediterranean 
countries may wish to consider introducing fiscal rules or legislative provisions to 
deter unwarranted policies. This can be particularly important for oil-exporting 
countries, as oil revenues are often linked to expansionary policies. Apart from a 
very high level of public debt in Lebanon, Mediterranean countries have experienced 
a gradual reduction in their debt levels over the last four years (see Chart 6).  
 
External sector 
As is the case with fiscal balances, current account balances reflect to a great extent 
the asymmetric impact of oil production on oil producing and non-oil producing 
Mediterranean countries (see Table 2).  In particular, for Jordan, Lebanon and 
Morocco the deterioration of current account balances in the last few years is mainly 
the result of increasing oil prices, whereas for Libya and Syria declining current 
account balances can be linked to expansionary fiscal policies and import growth. 
On the other hand, Tunisia has maintained low and manageable current account 




Furthermore, the evolution of the current account reflects buoyant domestic demand 
(both consumption and investment), often accompanied by strong money and credit 
growth.  Mediterranean countries have been gradually increasing trade links and 
flows since 1999 (see Chart 7) and there is room to further expand the openness of 
trade. However, this welcome development increases the sensitivity to imported 
inflation, rendering the pass-through into domestic prices more significant. 
 
The financing of the current account deficit becomes a critical factor for the 
accumulation of foreign reserve assets and the ability to maintain a fixed peg 
exchange rate regime in adverse economic conditions. Since 2003, Mediterranean 
countries have recorded an increase in FDI flows (see Chart 8), which has helped 
accelerate structural reforms. And all countries managed to increase their foreign 
exchange reserves, reflecting the aforementioned increase in FDI flows, at least since 
2003. In this respect, adequate foreign exchange reserves have provided a safety 
cushion to policymakers, while allowing intervention  in foreign exchange markets 
to support the fixed peg.  
 
Capital account liberalisation 
As far as capital account liberalisation is concerned, all Mediterranean countries, 
except for Lebanon, had significant controls in place in the early 1990s (see Annex 2). 
Indeed at the end of 2008, only Israel and Jordan maintained no or few minor 
restrictions on the movement of capital, respectively, in contrast to other countries, 
where extensive controls still exist. Mediterranean countries following a fixed peg 
regime have maintained, at least to some extent, capital controls. Egypt and Israel 
which had more liberalised capital flows moved towards more flexible exchange rate 
regimes, while the case of Jordan demonstrates that it is possible to advance capital 
account liberalisation while maintaining a fixed peg regime.     
 
The potential destabilising features of a rapid and unprepared liberalisation should 
not be underestimated as these may have a detrimental effect on the smooth conduct 
of monetary policy and may even be associated with financial crises, threatening the 
sustainability of the fixed exchange rate regime.  It is widely agreed that there is an  
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optimal path for economic liberalisation (McKinnon, 1982, 1991) and there is now 
widespread agreement as to the characteristics of that path, which in conjunction 
with some related preconditions, can guide policymakers through a smooth capital 
account liberalisation. These preconditions, which refer to the existence of an overall 
framework that is fully aligned with the exchange rate objective, will be highlighted 
while studying the case of Cyprus in Section 5.  
 
Gibson et al (2006) argue that the first step should be the liberalisation of the current 
account, otherwise the burden of adjustment in the event of shocks would mainly 
fall on the capital account. It is important that the liberalisation of trade takes place 
before either domestic or external financial liberalisation, since tariffs distort relative 
prices. Otherwise, if financial markets are liberalised with prices remaining 
distorted, finance will be attracted to artificially profitable sectors and a 
misallocation of resources will occur.  
 
A sound financial sector should, in principle, be in place before the liberalisation of 
the external sector so as to facilitate the convergence between domestic and foreign 
interest rates, thereby deterring any destabilising capital flows. Turning to the 
banking systems in Mediterranean countries, which are the main source of financial 
intermediation, the evidence is that up to now there has been limited domestic 
liberalisation and the financial systems remain underdeveloped. More specifically, 
despite strong credit growth observed over the last few years the overall low level of 
credit to the private sector points to underdeveloped financial systems, especially in 
Libya and Syria (see Charts 9 and 10).  Indicative of the relatively low development 
of the financial sector is the level of broad money as a percent of GDP (see Chart 11). 
As a proportion of GDP, Lebanon has by far the most developed banking sector. 
Accordingly, it is expected that Mediterranean countries will further develop their 
financial sectors before proceeding with more capital account liberalisation. 
 
Finally, with respect to FDI inflows, which in general operate within a liberalised 
environment, Gibson et al (2006) show that, despite liberalisation, there is evidence 
that some Mediterranean countries are not performing to potential and should be  
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attracting more FDI. This indicates that there is scope for national and regional 
policies which could help boost FDI flows in these countries. Furthermore, 
appropriate policies can increase the effectiveness of the FDI attracted in terms of the 
benefits for the host economies. 
 
Challenges for monetary policy 
Overall, Mediterranean countries are small open economies exhibiting robust 
growth performance and, over the last years, increasing trade integration. At the 
same time, elevated inflation and unemployment rates point to some rigidity in 
product and labour markets, while a cursory analysis suggests that the pass-through 
of global prices into domestic price developments is important. 
 
In these circumstances, stepping up the requisite structural reforms that will inter alia 
attract foreign investment becomes even more important for Mediterranean 
countries. Critical reforms relating to the enhancement of competition in product 
markets and liberalisation of labour markets and the external capital account are 
needed.  With regard to the latter, Mediterranean countries following a fixed 
exchange rate regime may be faced with some challenges, as opting for more capital 
mobility may call for increased exchange rate (and interest rate) flexibility so as to 
overcome or avoid the “impossible trinity”. In this context, besides volatile and 
destabilising capital flows, external shocks, such as an inflationary shock, are also 
likely to hamper the smooth conduct of monetary policy. As was the case with 
European countries that joined the euro area, Mediterranean countries are likely to 
experience significantly increased inflows and outflows following liberalisation, 
even if a country has in place a sound and liberalised banking system, a credible 
monetary policy regime and adheres to the suggested path of capital account 
liberalisation. This challenge calls for increased vigilance by the monetary 
authorities.  
 
Moreover, reflecting the pursuit of fixed pegs, high net foreign assets held by the 
central banks of these countries has contributed to the existence of a liquidity 
surplus in the banking system, which complicates the conduct of monetary policy.  
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Within the context of excess liquidity in their banking systems, Mediterranean 
countries may be hesitant to increase interest rates in response to inflationary 
pressures, as this may trigger increased capital inflows and consequently exacerbate 
the problem of excess liquidity. In addition to its limited room for manoeuvre, 
monetary policy in exchange rate-targeting Mediterranean countries is further 
constrained by underdeveloped operational frameworks, characterised by reliance 
on high minimum reserve ratios and interest rate ceilings4.  
 
As far as minimum reserves are concerned, the high minimum reserve ratio and the 
low remuneration rate are impediments to the efficient functioning of the system, as 
is the relatively high use of deposit facilities.  In response to the financial crisis, 
Mediterranean countries have tried to ease monetary policy conditions by lowering 
interest rates and reserve requirements.  The degree of reduction depends on 
country specific circumstances, including the exchange rate regime, the intensity of 
the economic slowdown and inflationary pressures, as well as considerations 
concerning capital inflows and current account positions. 
 
5. Exchange rate policy in Cyprus: a story of pegs 
In Cyprus pegged exchange rates were long considered as an anti-inflationary tool. 
In fact, following the establishment of the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) in 1963, i.e. 
three years after the island’s independence, a pegged exchange rate regime was in 
place up until accession to the euro area in 2008.  It was believed that the 
establishment of an unambiguous objective anchor for economic policy would 
induce greater discipline, instil confidence in the currency and help to establish 
credibility for measures to contain inflation.  A number of other characteristics of the 
Cypriot economy, such as its size and openness, wage indexation and, in the past, 
administratively determined interest rates as well as the existence of capital controls, 
all made a strong case for a fixed exchange rate arrangement, placing the burden of 
containing inflation on the exchange rate. 
 
                                                           
4 See European Central Bank (2006).    
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Having chosen fixed exchange rates as the appropriate regime, the remaining issue 
for the authorities was the choice of a proper anchor currency.  Initially, the Cyprus 
pound was tied to sterling with a fixed parity.  The “generalised floating” that came 
about with the demise of the  Bretton Woods exchange rate arrangements called for a 
revision of this policy since continuation of pegging to sterling, or for that matter to 
any of the major currencies, would in effect have meant floating vis-à-vis all other 
currencies. 
 
Following the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1970, the Cyprus pound was first linked 
to an import-weighted basket and then in 1984 to a trade-weighted basket. In the 
early 1990s, Cyprus’s aspiration to become a member of the EU rekindled the debate 
about the appropriate exchange rate policy.  The question that was brought to the 
fore related to the optimal exchange rate strategy for the eventual adoption of the 
euro, as the design of such a strategy needed to take into account the specific 
requirements that the euro adoption process entailed.  In particular, the road to the 
euro required the complete abolition of capital controls by the time of EU accession, 
along with various structural reforms and the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria, 
which entailed, inter alia, participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) 
for at least two years. 
 
On 19 June 1992, the Cyprus pound was unilaterally pegged to the ecu, with the 
central rate of CY£1=ECU 1,7086 and fluctuation margins of ±2,25%, reflecting the 
policy of linking the economy more closely to the economies of the EU.   
 
With the birth of the euro a decision was taken to link the Cyprus pound to the euro 
with a central rate and margins equal to those of the ecu5.  The same exchange rate 
policy was followed after Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 and the following year when 
the Cyprus pound officially participated in ERM II.  The policy of unilaterally 
linking the Cyprus pound to the ecu and then to the euro culminated in the adoption 
of the euro as the island’s legal tender in 2008. 
                                                           
5 See Kyriacou and Syrichas (1999) on the macroeconomic implications of the introduction of the euro for the 
Cypriot economy.  
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Assessing the exchange rate policy in Cyprus  
To assess the impact of the exchange rate policy on Cyprus’s economic performance 
we turn our attention to inflation and growth paths over the entire period when 
fixed exchange rates prevailed on the island.  Cyprus has a small, open and services 
oriented economy with the ratio of total trade (exports plus imports of goods and 
services) to GDP of around 100%.  Real GDP growth has been historically robust, 
averaging 5,1% between 1961 and 2009, which is consistently above the average 
trend for the euro area as well as for the EU as a whole (see Chart 12).  As a result, 
Cyprus has achieved a satisfactory degree of sustainable real convergence with the 
EU. In 2007 Cyprus’s per capita GDP in PPS terms accounted for 91,9% of the EU 
average.  
 
In line with this robust track record of real GDP growth, the unemployment rate has 
historically been lower and more stable than in the rest of the EU (see Chart 13). 
Indeed, this stability has been remarkable6.  
 
Though one might expect high economic growth in conjunction with low 
unemployment to be linked to higher inflation, this did not materialise in Cyprus. As 
shown in the next section, inflation remained relatively contained throughout the 
years, an outcome that could be attributed to the prudent monetary and exchange 
rate policies followed by the CBC since its establishment in 1963.  
 
Containment of inflation 
Inflation in Cyprus has been contained over time. Spanning a period of more than 40 
years, price increases averaged between 2%-3% with the most noteworthy exception 
being the experience of the 1970s (see Chart 14). The spike recorded in the 1970s was 
the consequence of two oil shocks. But even during that decade, inflation in Cyprus 
was significantly lower than in the countries of its anchor currencies. Chart 14 shows 
that the only country with a superior performance in price stability was Germany. 
Germany’s performance was the outcome of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s clear price 
stability mandate and the monetary target strategy pursued after the collapse of the 
                                                           
6 The short-lived spike during the period 1974-75 was due to the Turkish invasion.  
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fixed exchange rate regime (Issing, 2005).  In Cyprus, no monetary switching took 
place in the face of the collapse of Bretton Woods. However, this policy of fixed 
exchange rate targeting delivered price stability even in the face of severe adverse 
conditions vis-à-vis the invasion of 1974.  As noted in Orphanides (2008)  "in 
retrospect, the experience of Cyprus may serve as an instructive example of the long-term 
benefits of a monetary policy focused on price stability, even in the presence of dislocations 
that might have been seen as providing cover for looser, less responsible monetary policy in 
other contexts" (pp. 372-373).  
 
Valuable information is also revealed by examining the components of the CPI. Most 
of the CPI’s volatility during 1984-2007 is the result of the variability exhibited by 
locally produced products.  Chart 15 illustrates that locally produced products are 
mainly responsible for the spikes observed in the CPI index. Within this category, 
agricultural products are the most volatile. In addition, Chart 15 confirms the 
previous analysis that inflation in Cyprus has remained at low levels on the back of 
imported products, whose prices follow a distinct negative trend. In other words, 
under the fixed exchange rate regime, Cyprus was importing, on average, the 
inflation of its trading partners7.   
 
Key features of the success 
The strategy of achieving price stability through exchange rate stability was applied 
resolutely in a credible and consistent fashion by the CBC. The long track record of 
price stability in Cyprus is the most obvious proof of the success of this strategy. The 
CBC’s strict adherence to this simple rule was observed during the period of the 
Turkish invasion and its aftermath as well as during the ERM crisis in 1992. During 
these two critical periods, the Cyprus pound remained firmly pegged despite the 
fact that significant competitiveness losses were experienced, which were the result 
of devalued currencies. These two events further strengthened the CBC’s reputation 
for maintaining macroeconomic stability. The behaviour of the Cypriot authorities 
                                                           
7 For other determinants of inflation in Cyprus see Syrichas (2008).   
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was in line with the prevailing consensus that favoured a fixed exchange rate regime 
on the basis of the discipline that peg arrangements were believed to induce8.   
 
The CBC’s commitment to price stability through the targeting of the exchange rate 
was a simple and transparent rule that could be evaluated at any moment by looking 
at the external value of the Cyprus pound. The testing of this rule during difficult 
times enhanced confidence in this policy and anchored inflation expectations.  This 
strategy’s success also lay in the fact that CBC decisions were politically 
independent.  Even though CBC independence was only granted officially in 2002, 
the government’s representative on the CBC’s Board of Directors never objected to 
the Board’s monetary policy decisions.  
 
The resolve, credibility and independence of the CBC were essential but not 
adequate for the success of the exchange rate targeting strategy. The authorities 
recognised the impossible trinity and needed to make sure that monetary conditions 
were consistent with economic fundamentals.   
 
Orphanides (2008) recognises additional elements which had contributed to this 
policy’s success. The first element was the close monitoring of monetary aggregates 
and credit, especially credit to the private sector, with a view towards reigning in 
excessive rates of expansion that might be a threat to stability. The second element 
was the close monitoring of the current account deficit, both as an indicator of 
inflationary pressures and as a warning signal which helps to avoid external 
imbalances. This strategy’s theoretical underpinnings can be found in the literature 
of the balance of payments crises (see, among others, Krugman, 1979 and Flood and 
Garber, 1984). Using a simple monetary model, Flood and Garber have shown that 
in a small country with purchasing power parity and free capital mobility, excessive 
credit growth will result in a gradual draining of foreign reserves. Agents expecting 
the eventual exhaustion of reserves and the collapse of the fixed exchange rate 
                                                           
8 It was also recognised that apart from losing one’s credibility, a policy of devaluation would have eventually 
exacerbated inflation. Full employment conditions, the existence of the cost of living allowance (COLA), and low 
price elasticity for the demand for exports and imports of goods, meant that a currency devaluation in Cyprus 
would have brought a worsening of the trade account, with the higher demand for exports almost completely 
offset by the resulting higher increase in expenditure on imports.   
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regime will launch an attack on the regime.  Hence, one might infer from Flood and 
Garber the significance of closely monitoring credit expansion and the current 
account (i.e. the level of foreign reserves) for the sustainability of parity, which is 
what the Cypriot authorities had been doing.   
 
There were some cases where economic behaviour (as reflected in monetary 
aggregates) was inconsistent with economic fundamentals. The trinity was violated 
and therefore the regime’s sustainability was threatened. Capital controls prevailing 
in Cyprus for most of the period under review definitely helped the authorities 
circumvent the impossible trinity and sustain the fixed exchange rate regime. 
However, the significance of capital controls cannot be overemphasised. The 
literature (e.g. Wyplosz, 1986) and country experiences worldwide have 
demonstrated that capital restrictions may delay a speculative attack but cannot stop 
the eventual collapse of a fixed rate regime if inconsistent policies are followed over 
the long run.  The longevity of the Cypriot regime should principally be attributed to 
the fact that, for most of the time, the authorities followed prudent policies. In 
periods of adverse economic developments, the authorities followed a flexible 
strategy which adapted to the prevailing economic environment.  The success of the 
strategy in Cyprus relates to the deployment of non-traditional policy tools such as 
quantitative credit constraints.  Chart 16 shows the timing of imposition and 
relaxation of credit ceilings in periods of hardship. The most significant ones were in: 
1967, when credit ceilings were relaxed to promote growth; 1980, when credit 
ceilings were enforced to contain inflationary pressures; and 1999, when credit 
ceilings were imposed to contain stock market exuberance. 
 
According to Orphanides (2008), these tools "proved useful supplements to the more 
traditional tools---and indeed sometimes the crucial main tools---for controlling threats 
towards imbalances.  Non-traditional tools were used with caution, however, in order to 
control and correct imbalances in the short term, and not to obscure and prolong them.  Care 
was needed, of course, because it was well understood that, when improperly used, controls 
and restraints can easily engender unsustainable imbalances, thus increasing the risk of 
economic collapse at a later stage" (p. 374).  
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Exchange rate policy in view of EU accession and financial liberalisation  
In the 1990s, the Cypriot economy was entering new phase of capital liberalisation 
and structural changes in order to pave the way for EU accession and eventual 
adoption of the euro.  Preparations were not restricted only to exchange rate policy 
but were extended to other areas, particularly the monetary and banking sectors.  
This was to ensure that the transition to a new liberalised environment was based on 
a well thought-out and comprehensive programme.  In the mid-1990s a new 
operational framework for conducting monetary policy through open market 
operations was initiated. During this period reverse repo operations became the 
CBC’s main instrument for managing liquidity, replacing the liquid asset ratio which 
was the main tool of monetary policy for over 20 years. These monetary instruments 
were at the heart of the monetary reforms launched in early 1996, with the aim of 
influencing monetary conditions through more market oriented methods. Under the 
new monetary regime, reserve requirements were substantially reduced, with the 
freed liquidity in the form treasury bills.  This liquidity entered the market gradually 
over a seven year period.  At the same time, two standing facilities were established. 
The overnight deposit facility and the marginal lending facility, which allowed 
banks to place their overnight surpluses or to borrow overnight from the CBC 
respectively.9   
 
The introduction of the new framework led the way for the initiation of two 
important structural reforms in Cyprus. First and most important was the abolition 
of the long-lived statutory interest rate ceiling, which was accompanied by a 
relaxation of all restrictions on medium and long-term foreign borrowing by 
Cypriots. Since the interest rate liberalisation came into force in 2000, this meant that 
the CBC was running a market based operational framework with the key 
instrument, the interest rate, having a statutory ceiling. This unorthodox regime 
functioned well most of the time, however there were instances when the ceiling was 
reached and liquidity could not be controlled. In these instances the CBC had to 
resort to more direct methods. 
 
                                                           
9 See Central Bank of Cyprus (1996).  
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The second reform was the new Banking Law introduced by the CBC with the 
intention of strengthening supervision and prudential rules.  This reform was 
necessary so as to enable the banking system to cope in an environment of potential 
destabilising capital flows and asset booms. With the aim of ensuring that the 
banking system remained sound, a new Banking Law was enacted in 1997.  The law 
provided the legal basis for prudential rules and made supervision more effective, 
with the minimum authorisation requirements and prudential rules being in 
compliance with the EU banking directives. The Banking Law also included 
enforcement provisions and penalties.  The responsible Division in the CBC had the 
necessary expertise in supervision and was well staffed with qualified and 
competent personnel. All aspects of regulatory and prudential concern were under 
the CBC’s responsibility. Moreover, banks possessed the prerequisite in terms of 
experience, human resources and technological infrastructure to move into the 
liberalised environment safely. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned essential reforms, the policy of keeping relatively 
fixed exchange rates in a liberalised environment was soon to be tested. Following 
the abolition in January 2001 of restrictions on medium-term and long-term 
borrowing with maturities of over two years by residents, there was a significant 
increase in capital inflows, as private individuals and firms increased their 
borrowing in foreign currency, mostly euro, taking advantage of the interest rate 
differential between euro-denominated and Cyprus pound–denominated loans.   
This exerted upward pressure on the exchange rate, exposing borrowers to increased 
exchange rate risks. As a result, the CBC abolished the narrow bands of ±2,25% on 13 
August 2001, so that only the ±15% margins remained in line with ERM II. But 
despite the abolition of the ±2,25% bands, the Cyprus pound, though fluctuatng,  
remained within these narrow bands. Thus, investors in general showed confidence 
in the exchange rate policy and, more specifically, in the currency. 
 
The policy decision of 13 August 2001 was taken simultaneously with another 
important decision, i.e. the reduction in interest rates by 50 basis points, which was 
necessary due to the anticipated negative impact of the global economic slowdown  
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on the Cyprus economy. The decline in interest rates in Cyprus also led to the 
reduction in the interest rate differential between euro-denominated and pound-
denominated loans, which removed some of the incentive for residents to borrow in 
foreign currency. Interest rates were subsequently reduced further in September and 
November 2001, by 50 basis points each time.  
 
Moreover, significant capital flows were difficult to manage and could undermine 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. Substantial capital inflows were principally 
responsible for the excess liquidity observed in Cyprus since the beginning of 2001.  
The CBC regularly intervened in the market so as to absorb this excess liquidity and 
prevent monetary policy from becoming too lax. The operations conducted by the 
CBC at the time were facilitated by the subdued demand for credit in 2002, 
compared with the previous year, since commercial banks were willing to place their 
excess liquidity at the CBC. The financial dimension of these operations should not 
be ignored as sterilised interventions were depleting the profits of the CBC. The 
problem was complicated further by the fact that limited exchange rate flexibility 
caused the build-up of unhedged foreign liabilities by domestic firms. In the case of 
a successful attack on the peg, the ensuing devaluation that would result would 
create a significant cost to the firms’ balance sheet, the banking system and, 
ultimately, the economy. 
 
The conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy became even more complicated 
in 2004 by adverse fiscal conditions, in conjunction with political uncertainty 
surrounding the prospects for the solution of the Cyprus problem and groundless 
rumours of an imminent devaluation of the Cyprus pound.  The severe capital 
outflows and the concomitant currency depreciation pressures following these 
developments, required the CBC to exercise increased vigilance and support the 
exchange rate by all means.  At an extraordinary meeting on the eve of EU accession, 
the Monetary Policy Committee of the CBC decided to increase its interest rates by 
100 basis points and at the same time send a strong signal supporting the Cyprus 
pound. As a result, markets calmed and capital flows returned to their normal 
seasonal pattern.  In this connection, proper communication and the readiness of the  
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CBC to maintain policy consistency towards achieving the primary objective at any 
cost was imperative.  This enabled the stabilisation of market expectations. 
 
An additional challenge faced in the period under review relates to the real estate 
market. More specifically, the strong increase in house prices which was mainly 
fuelled by increased foreign and domestic demand, had already begun in the run-up 
to EU accession.  The high rate with which prices increased and the exposure of the 
banking sector to the real estate market through the granting of mortgage loans, 
raised concerns about possible negative repercussions for household debt and 
servicing as well as for the banks’ loan portfolios, particularly in the case of tighter 
monetary conditions.  With the aim of safeguarding financial stability and protecting 
deposits, the CBC issued a circular to banks requiring them to assess the 
creditworthiness of loan applicants more thoroughly and to strictly adhere to the set 
mortgage loan ceiling after accounting for adequate security pledged by the 
borrower. In addition, the CBC communicated extensively to the general public the 
risks inherent in mortgage borrowing. 
 
During the ERM II period, the Cypriot economy continued to face some old and 
some new challenges. As a result of the prevailing interest differential between 
Cyprus and the euro area, capital continued to flow into the island partly in the form 
of foreign currency borrowing, and was mainly used for property purchase and 
consumption. Rapid credit growth, together with the brisk pace of economic activity, 
further exacerbated inflationary pressures. Inflation, particularly in the second half 
of 2007, followed an upward trend as a result of rising oil and food prices.  At the 
end of 2007, the current account deficit had reached its highest level since 1978. The 
CBC responded to these developments in terms of its communication to the public. 
More specifically, it issued frequent reminders to the public of the exchange rate risk 
associated with borrowing in foreign currency.  On the prudential side, the CBC, 
through the issuing of guidelines, reduced the maximum loan to value ratio for 
mortgages and delayed decreases of the minimum reserve ratio to much lower euro 
area levels. The prevailing conditions at the time prevented the CBC from fully  
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converging the interest rates and the ratio of minimum reserve to the euro area 
levels ahead of time. Both were converged just before the adoption of the euro.  
 
The irrevocable fixing of the exchange rate, i.e. the setting of the conversion rate of 
the Cyprus pound to the euro, meant the relinquishment of monetary policy by the 
CBC.  Setting domestic interest rates to contain inflation at the national level was no 
longer possible.  At the time when this loss in policy tools was taking place, 
inflationary pressures had already begun mounting in the Cypriot economy. In 
particular, HICP inflation surged to 5,4% in August 2008, which was the result of 
both external and domestic factors as well as policy decisions precipitated by the 
accession of Cyprus to the euro area. Domestically, rapid credit expansion was 
fuelling domestic demand, which added to higher inflation in the context of already 
strong economic activity (i.e. close to or above the potential rate). The reduction in 
the official CBC interest rates by 50 basis points in December 2007 and in the 
minimum reserve ratio to the level applied in the Eurosystem on 1 January 2008, 
were two key factors propelling the rapid credit and money expansion.  The surge in 
oil and food prices was exacerbating domestic inflationary pressures even further. In 
addition, heightened inflation expectations, linked to perceptions formed in the run-
up to euro adoption, played a role, albeit a limited one, in aggravating price 
pressures through wage and price setting behaviour. It should be mentioned that 
excessive credit growth was also reflected in the widening of the current account 
deficit.  
 
Against this background and in the context of Cyprus’s monetary integration, it soon 
became clear that the CBC could do little to reverse the situation and that the burden 
of tackling these challenges would mainly fall on other policy areas. In fact, as most 
of the credit growth was channelled to the real estate and construction sectors, the 
CBC took macro-prudential measures in the field of banking supervision and, 
among other things, reduced the loan to value ratio with the aim of restraining 
excessive credit growth and moderating the exposure of the banking sector to risks 
related to these sectors. These were in fact the only measures that the CBC could take  
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and were subsequently relaxed in the light of some deceleration in key credit 
aggregates. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy lessons 
Mediterranean countries following a fixed exchange rate regime have recently been 
confronted with some challenges that test the efficacy of the regimes in place. These 
challenges mostly ensue from the combination of inflationary pressures (fuelled by 
strong domestic demand and rising energy and food prices) and the need for further 
capital account liberalisation amid conditions of liquidity surplus in the banking 
system and rapid money and credit growth. In light of these developments, some of 
these exchange rate-targeting Mediterranean countries are assessing the framework 
in place or even contemplating the change to a more flexible arrangement, which 
would allow them greater freedom to pursue domestic objectives.   
 
The case of Cyprus confirms the view that, under certain conditions, it is possible to 
maintain a credible fixed exchange rate regime while advancing capital account 
liberalisation and still achieve the primary objective of monetary policy within a 
sustainable macroeconomic environment. These conditions refer to the existence of a 
policy framework that is fully consistent with the exchange rate objective. In 
particular, as far as monetary policy is concerned, the previous analysis has shown 
that the adherence to a simple monetary rule, such as an exchange rate target, can 
confer credibility on a central bank and deliver price stability, something particularly 
important for a small open economy. Maintaining a clear and unambiguous policy 
stance, even under strain, can boost policy credibility and facilitate future policies.  
This hard earned credibility requires that a central bank enjoys full independence.  
Over a relatively long period of time, when there are phases of economic downturn 
or volatility, the regime might be tested as political pressure for devaluation 
increases. Succumbing to these pressures could seriously undermine the credibility 
of a central bank. Another important lesson drawn from the Cyprus case is that this 
strategy needs to be supplemented by additional measures.  Monetary aggregates, 
and in particular credit, should be closely monitored and controlled, if necessary. To 
that end, any use of non-traditional measures, such as quantitative credit restraints,  
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should be prudent so as not to engender potential market distortions and 
inefficiencies which would subsequently undermine the regime in place. The current 
account also warrants close monitoring, both as an indicator of inflationary 
pressures and as a warning signal helping to avoid unsustainable external 
imbalances.   
 
Capital account liberalisation requires that the authorities prepare well in advance a 
comprehensively thought-out plan, including, first and foremost, reforms in the 
conduct of monetary policy and banking supervision. A sound banking sector 
should exhibit the requisite human resource and technical capabilities to adapt to the 
new liberalised environment safely. Notwithstanding the existence of a 
comprehensive liberalisation plan and a vigorous banking system, the Cypriot 
experience has shown that challenges are still likely to emerge, e.g. destabilising 
capital inflows and outflows (triggered by interest rate differentials), excess liquidity 
in the banking system and unwarranted asset price movements. The central bank 
will need to be vigilant and respond decisively, including recourse to macro-
prudential measures. Fiscal and structural policies should, in any case, be supportive 
of monetary policy. A rule-based fiscal framework may be warranted in order to 
entrench fiscal discipline, while reforms should aim at removing nominal rigidities 
in wages and prices, particularly downward rigidities.    
 
All in all, the longevity of the fixed exchange rate regime in Cyprus should be seen 
as testimony to prudent fiscal and monetary policies. This macroeconomic 
framework was utilised by a credible and independent central bank to maintain 
parity and achieve price stability. The competitiveness of the economy was not 
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Table 1: Exchange rate regimes and capital controls in Mediterranean countries 
Country Currency  Regime  Capital 
controls 
Algeria  Algerian dinar  Managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange 
rate 
Yes  
Egypt  Egyptian pound  Managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange 
rate 
Yes 
Israel  Israeli sheqel  Independent floating  No  
Jordan  Jordanian dinar  Officially pegged to the SDR, but in practice pegged to the 
dollar since late 1995 – conventional pegged arrangement 
Few (minor) 
restrictions 
Lebanon  Lebanese pound  Pegged to the dollar – conventional pegged arrangement  Yes 
Libya  Libyan dinar  Conventional pegged arrangement involving more than one 
foreign exchange market - the arrangement shown is that 









Conventional pegged arrangement - pegged to a basket of 
currencies consisting of EUR at 80% and USD at 20%.  
Yes 
Syria  Syrian pound  Pegged  to SDR within horizontal bands  Yes 
Tunisia  Tunisian dinar  Conventional pegged arrangement to EUR/USD composite  Yes 
Source: IMF(2007, 2008).  
 
Table 2: Current account balances  
 Jordan  Lebanon  Libya  Morocco  Syria  Tunisia 
1992  -14.407  -49.857  5.219 -1.882  3.964 -6.598 
1993  -11.643 -6.106 -2.734 -1.733 -1.775 -8.781 
1994 -6.447 -6.166  0.523 -2.136 -5.633 -4.182 
1995 -3.813 -9.634 15.674 -3.218  1.251 -4.308 
1996  -3.205  -10.129 12.16 0.086  -0.233  -2.444 
1997 0.403  -31.891  11.301  -0.234 2.482 -3.14 
1998 0.276  -29.633 7.411  -0.345 0.802  -3.407 
1999 4.967  -19.001 13.26  -0.427 1.803  -2.153 
2000  0.704  -17.218  29.8 -1.291  5.722 -4.218 
2001 0.051  -19.306  12.286 4.271 6.284  -5.109 
2002 5.689  -14.141 3.015 3.654 -3.64 -3.55 
2003 11.495  -13.203 19.918  3.194  -12.564 -2.946 
2004 0.068  -15.523  21.388 1.694  -1.583  -2.695 
2005  -17.986  -13.385 38.88 1.787  -2.313  -1.028 
2006  -11.634 -5.266 44.581  2.152 -1.834 -1.991 
2007  -17.609 -6.779 40.655 -0.093 -2.182 -2.574 
2008  -10.272  -11.524 40.709 -5.217 -3.564 -4.191 
2009 -5.564  -11.073  16.87  -5.03 -4.512 -3.361 
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Chart 2: Weighted GDP of countries with fixed and floating exchange rate 
regimes 
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Chart 3: Inflation 
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Chart 4: Weighted inflation rate of countries with fixed and floating 
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Chart 5: General government balances 
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Chart 6: Public debt 
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Chart 8: Inward FDI 
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Chart 9: Credit to the private sector 
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Chart 11: Broad money 
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  Chart 16: M2 and claims on the private sector 
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Annex 1: History of exchange rate regimes in Mediterranean countries 
 
Algeria  From 1991-1995 the Algerian dinar was fixed to a basket of currencies (the weights being determined by trade and capital movements). On 23 December 1995 it moved to a 
managed floating system, although in practice it still maintains tight control over the dinar/dollar exchange rate. 
Egypt  De facto operating an exchange rate peg to the dollar from 1991 to mid-2000; significant depreciation was allowed from mid-2000 onwards. At end-January 2001, a band was 
introduced (±1% on either side of the central rate of LE2.85/$). Throughout 2001 and into 2002, the central rate was devalued on a number of occasions and the band widened to 
±3%. As of end January 2003, the exchange rate was officially allowed to float. In December 2004, Egypt moved to a unified flexible exchange rate system and established a 
formal interbank foreign exchange market. Nevertheless, although Egypt maintains de jure a managed float with no predetermined path for the exchange rate, the exchange rate 
between the dollar and the pound has remained stable since 2006.  
Israel  The new shekal was pegged to a basket of currencies (DM, FrF, £, ¥, $) with bands around the central rate of ±5%. From end 1991, the central rate and bands were adjusted 
according to inflation differentials. In June 1995, the bands were widened to ±7% and the weights adjusted (on basis of 1994 direction of trade statistics). In June 1997, the bands 
were widened to ±15% and the rate of adjustment of the upper and lower bands were altered such that the bands eventually became wider and wider. By 2003 the band width had 
reach 55% (that is, ±27.5%). In 2004 the regime was reclassified as an independent float (on a de facto basis) and in June 2005 the exchange rate band was abandoned de jure. 
Jordan  Up until 1995, the dinar was pegged to the currencies of the SDR; from end-1995 it has been effectively pegged to the dollar. 
Lebanon  Up until 1998 it was classified de jure as floating. However, de facto, from the early 1993 it was operating a crawling depreciation peg to the $ before moving to a fixed peg in 
1998; the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar depreciated by only 13.5% between 1993 and 1998. 
Libya  Libya follows a conventional pegged arrangement, involving more than one foreign exchange market. The arrangement shown is that maintained in the major market. De Jure the 
dinar is pegged to the SDR and the exchange rate moves within bands that get larger and larger with the dinar being allowed to depreciate to the limit of the band. Only in 2002 and 
2003 were official devaluations carried out. De facto the dinar should be classified as a peg with discrete devaluations. 
Mauritania  The exchange rate has been de facto pegged to the U.S. dollar since 24 October 2005. In late 2006, the Central Bank of Mauritania completed all the prior actions for establishing a 
new framework to determine the exchange rate based on supply and demand mechanisms. This led to the lifting of exchange measures on current transactions and the opening of 
the first rate-fixing session on 25 January 2007. 
Morocco  Initially the dirham was pegged to the French franc. In June 1996, a central rate was established relative to a basket of currencies and the exchange rate was kept within a band 
around the central rate. From 1999, with the creation of the euro, the basket of currencies changed to include €, £ and $ (with the weights determined by trade). 
Syria  A multiple exchange rate system operates (recently the number of rates was reduced to two, the official rate and the neighbouring markets rate). The Syrian pound is pegged to the 
SDR. 
Tunisia  Until February 1994, the dinar was pegged to a basket of currencies. Thereafter it became a managed float; it was reclassified in 1999 as a crawling peg; reclassified at the end of 
2000 as managed floating with no preannounced path. From 1 January 2002, it has been following a real effective exchange rate rule. 
Sources: Gibson et al (2006) and IMF(2007, 2008).   
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Annex 2: Capital controls in Mediterranean countries 
Sources: Gibson et al (2006) and IMF(2007, 2008). 
 
Algeria  1990: fairly extensive controls. Export proceeds needed to be surrendered; residents had to repatriate and 
surrender any assets acquired abroad; capital transfers abroad required authorisation; inward FDI was 
permitted and repatriation guaranteed. In 2000 there was some opening of portfolio investment to foreigners 
(allowing investments in the Algerian Stock Market, bond markets, etc. and the repatriation of investment 
sale proceeds). 
Egypt  1990: fairly extensive controls. Export receipts repatriation and surrender requirements were in place; 
outward capital transactions were restricted; some inward FDI and portfolio investment was permitted; 
multiple exchange rate system. By end-1991 a unitary exchange rate system had been adopted. From 1994, 
repatriation of export receipts was abolished; it was reintroduced briefly in March 2003 and abolished again 
in December 2004. 
Israel  1990: fairly extensive controls on export proceeds, capital movements. These were liberalised slowly starting 
in 1994 when outward FDI was partially liberalised, for example. In 1998 significant liberalisation occurred 
with limits on controlled capital movements being raised. From 1 January 2003, all controls were removed, 
with only some reporting requirements remaining. 
Jordan  1990: fairly extensive controls. Export receipts were controlled; inward capital movements were not 
restricted (including FDI), although permission was required for outward flows; repatriation of inward FDI 
capital was subject to approval. In 1994-95 the requirements re export receipts were liberalised. In 1997, 
most controls on capital transactions were abolished (July), although a few (minor) restrictions were 
introduced in 2000. 
Lebanon  1990: Only some capital transactions (including lending to non-residents, taking deposits from non-residents 
and bank lending to residents to purchase foreign exchange) involved controls; no controls on FDI. In 1998, 
more controls were added, with less important restrictions being introduced in subsequent years, although the 
system of controls does not appear to be that extensive. 
Libya  1990: An extensive system of capital controls was in place, including export receipt surrender rules and a 
requirement to obtain permission for any investment of capital abroad; inward FDI, on a joint-venture basis, 
was allowed provided that it is in the interests of the country’s development. In 1999 the parallel exchange 
market was legalised by creating a dual exchange rate system while the two rates were unified in 2002. 
Mauritania  Foreign investment is welcome in most sectors. The 2002 investment code uses privatization and 
liberalization to encourage foreign investors, guarantees freedom to transfer most capital and wages abroad, 
and makes foreign and domestic investment legally equal. Foreign investment is pre-screened. Certain 
financial activity, mining and hydrocarbons, telecommunications, and utilities are subject to additional 
restrictions. Reforms have been implemented, but complicated and burdensome bureaucratic procedures, 
corruption, and non-transparent legal, regulatory, and accounting systems inhibit investment. Residents and 
non-residents may hold foreign exchange accounts, but non-resident accounts are subject to some restrictions. 
Payments and transfers are subject to quantitative limits, bona fide tests, and prior approval in some cases. 
Morocco  1990: significant controls applied including export receipt surrender rules and restrictions on transfers of 
capital abroad; inward FDI was allowed although approval may have been necessary. Full liberalisation of 
inward FDI (including the repatriation of sale proceeds) was made in 1992. Liberalisation has subsequently 
been measured. 
Syria  1990: extensive controls on export receipts surrender, outward FDI flows and capital flows in general; FDI 
inflows were actually encouraged by favourable conditions in some areas; a system of multiple exchange 
rates operated. 2003-4 saw some simplification of the system (elimination of the repatriation and surrender 
requirements for export proceeds) but controls are still extensive. 
Tunisia  1990: extensive controls on export receipt surrender and capital account transactions; inward FDI was 
allowed and incentives were provided in some cases. Inward portfolio investment was partially liberalised in 
1995. Limited liberalisation, mainly relating to export proceeds surrender rules and outward FDI, was 
recorded in later years. 